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MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK BETTER: IMPROVING
THE PROCESS FOR DETERMINATION OF
NONECONOMIC LOSS*
JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN*"
I. PRESENTATION
The issue of nonpecuniary damages often arises in the context of medical
malpractice claims, and the current proposals for capping nonpecuniary damage
awards under consideration by Congress focus exclusively on the medical
malpractice arena. My perspective on these issues stems from my background not
as a torts scholar but as a health law and policy scholar whose work emphasizes the
interrelationship of economics and medical care decision making.
In this presentation, I want to focus initially on proposals for improving the
system of determining nonpecuniary loss, the most variable' and the most visible
part of the tort damages process. But I also want to consider one component of the
medical liability system because it is related to the problems ofcost containment-a
critical concern of those advocating reform of nonpecuniary damages awards in the
medical area. So, I will link up liability and damages, since they both contribute to
the overall policy concern regarding the costliness of the medical liability process.
Nonpecuniary damages awards pose problems for several reasons. The political
energy on the issue stems from provider and insurance company concerns about
costs associated with this component of damages, which are often seen as
amorphous and peculiarly subjective. This makes such awards conducive to outlier
judgments, which pose actuarial problems for insurers. From a broader perspective,
concern about nonpecuniary damages derives from considerations of fairness-that
individuals in similar circumstances should be treated similarly. This is the principle
of horizontal equity, a traditional concern in a common-law, case-by-case process
of adjudication, which has few tools for this type of case-to-case comparison or
normalization.
With respect to nonpecuniary loss, this type of concern about horizontal equity
raises important systemic issues, because nonpecuniary damage awards seem to be
the most variable component of tort damage awards, with much of the variation
being difficult to explain on readily observable or otherwise objective grounds.2
That type of variability can also raise costs for insurers because of the actuarial
challenges associated with variability in awards and the potential for unpredictable
outlier awards.
The tension I am identifying is that between overall (or macro) systemic concerns
and considerations related to achieving customized justice for injured victims in
individual case proceedings (micro-level considerations). Systemically, public
policy cannot ignore the implications of aggregate levels of expenditure associated
* Presentation delivered at the New Mexico Law Review's Symposium on February 19, 2005, at the
University of New Mexico School of Law. Transcription provided by Williams Brazil Court Reporting, LLC.
** B.A. 1966, M.A. Economics 1970, L.L.B. 1970, Yale. James F. Blumstein is the University Professor
of Constitutional Law & Health Law & Policy at Vanderbilt University Law School.
I. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbj erg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life andLimb in Tort:
Scheduling "PainandSuffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 919-24 (1989).
2. See id.
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with the tort system; nor should it ignore the seeming unfairness (in terms of
horizontal equity) accompanying the hard-to-explain variability in awards for cases
that appear to be quite similar. But those systemic concerns must be addressed in
a way that accommodates the critical goals of the tort system, assuring appropriate
compensation for injury and providing deterrence of poor quality or excessively
risky conduct.
This is a tension that exists not just in a common-law case process; the same type
of tension exists in medical care decision making. There is a need to allocate
resources in a macro sense from a fixed pool of money (through HMOs or other
allocating strategies), yet there is a desire to accommodate (at the micro-decisionmaking level) the customized decisions of individual physicians treating individual
patients. That tension is one that I want to focus on. So, my talk will be about both
damages and liability.
I want to suggest the need for a preemptive strategy. Tort reform is not just on
the agenda as a putative, future policy; nearly half the states, in one form or another,
have adopted forms of caps on damages. This is not just happening; this has been
going on for twenty years. At the federal level, there is serious consideration of
damage caps. One house is almost certain to pass a cap on pain and suffering of
$250,000 for medical malpractice damages. Caps exist in other states; for example,
Virginia (Jeff O'Connell's 3 state) historically has had a very stringent cap.4 The
existence of caps is a current reality in a significant number of jurisdictions. So, I
think that those of us who are concerned about that approach should think about
preemption. Talk about who in the debate over caps has the burden of proof is
appropriate in jurisdictions considering imposing such limits, but smart strategy
would preemptively recast the debate in recognition of the current reality and
prevalence of caps.
My proposal, which is one that co-authors Randall Bovbjerg, Frank Sloan, and
I made a number of years ago, 5 is to better structure decision-making regarding
nonpecuniary damages, a key and most variable component of damages. This is
beneficial particularly in light of the amorphous nature of the substantive doctrine
of nonpecuniary loss itself.6 A traditional legal policy tool for responding to
ambiguity is to structure the process of decision making as a procedural alternative
to a sometimes hard-to-achieve change in the underlying substance of a doctrine.
If we can't really get at the substance very well, if we don't have the tools, we can
structure the process of decision making in certain ways until we get a better
consensus on7 the substance. And so, that is basically the underlying rationale for
our strategy.

3. Jeffrey O'Connell etal., An Economic Model Costing "Early Offers " MedicalMalpracticeReform:
Trading Noneconomic Damagesfor Prompt Payment of Economic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REv. 259 (2005).
4. See, e.g., Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (upholding under the state and
federal constitutions Virginia's $750,000 total cap on damages); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989)
(upholding under the state and federal constitutions Virginia's $750,000 total cap on damages).
5. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1.
6. Id.; see also James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damagesfor PersonalInjury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991).
7. Improving the structure of decision making regarding noneconomic loss also could relieve some of the
cost-enhancing pressures that stem from defensive medicine. While defensive medicine is hard to define or to
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A. Some Background
My perspective is to focus on the appropriate use of economics in influencing
medical decision making. That perspective considers the role of incentives in health
care. From an economic perspective, the primacy of third-party payment in health
care raises the question whether levels of utilization are appropriate. This is the
traditional concern with moral hazard-that levels of expenditure increase when
decision makers' financial choices are heavily subsidized when decision makers are
(or perceive themselves as) spending someone else's money (a common pool of
insurance funding). The ideology of professionalism, which de-emphasizes and
even denigrates the role of economics in medical decision making,' has made it
difficult to talk seriously about the desirability or the impact of incentives. The
professional response, until the last dozen years or so, 9 was that incentives really
don't make a difference in medical care-medical care is a science, and economic
incentives are irrelevant to diagnostic or treatment decisions. That assumption about
the lack of impact of economic incentives on medical decision making allowed for
the widespread adoption of third-party payment, with an emphasis on low
deductibles and low rates of co-insurance. The prevalence of third-party payment
may well affect practice style and levels of utilization,'0 which in turn can affect
overall costs both directly and indirectly (through its impact on utilization through
defensive medicine).II
More recently, the professional critique of incentives is less empiricalincentives don't make a difference in medical care-and more normativeincentives are inappropriate and can corrupt medical practice.' 2 The fundamental
questions remain-what incentives exist, what is their impact, and is their impact
appropriate? A lot of the discussion about the issue of liability deals with how the
third-party payment incentives have changed and skewed the standard of liability.
I plan to make a suggestion on how to deal with that.
Let me turn to nonpecuniary loss. Remedy tracks theory. Damages implement the
theory of liability. The problem with developing a theory of nonpecuniary loss is
that it is real, but it is sometimes hard to determine just what the core of

identify with precision, the system of medical liability creates incentives for performing additional procedures and
services. Under conventional medical malpractice doctrine, the determination of the appropriate standard of care
is made ex post or after-the-fact (in a malpractice trial based on expert testimony) rather than in advance (or ex
ante). An incentive for additional utilization exists if the provider adjusts practice to a putative standard that is
inherently unknowable ex ante. An added increment of predictability in the area of nonpecuniary damages-an
important element of recovery for liability-may alleviate some of the pressure for additional utilization that stems
from defensive medicine.
8. See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform andCompeting Visions of Medical Care:Antitrust and
State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 (1994) (describing the assumptions and
consequences of different ways of thinking about medicine).
9. For a contemporary, sophisticated defense of the professional model in medical care, see M. Gregg
Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247 (2003).
10. For consideration of the impact of third-party payment on the customary practice in medical care, see
John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary MedicalMalpracticeStandard,77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991).
11. For a discussion ofdefensive medicine and its implications, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1994).
12. See, e.g., Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 594-95 (N.C. App. 1995),
affid, 464 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1995) (per curiam), rehearingdenied, 467 S.E.2d 718 (N.C. 1996) (finding liability

of hospital for allowing economic considerations to influence or unduly influence medical judgment).
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nonpecuniary loss is. There is a need for straightforward simplicity, clearly
delineated standards. Since juries typically make these decisions, it is important to
have a concept, a standard-something that is understandable and not so
amorphous. The result of (a) the amorphousness of the concept of nonpecuniary
loss, (b) the lack of a clear substantive definition, and (c) the lack of procedural
constraints on jury discretion has been that nonpecuniary loss is the most variable
of the damages components (based on evidence that our research team was able to
compile). 3
Standards of uniformity are lacking; there is a lot of discretion for inexperienced
juries who decide these cases without a context. The jury, in essence, is expected
to appraise a house without looking at comparable sales; the task becomes very,
very difficult. The members of the jury are functioning in a vacuum, lacking critical
information. The concern that many of us have is that this perceived case-by-case
variation at the micro decisionmaking level raises a systemic concern-horizontal
equity-at the macro level. That macro-level concern undermines the perception of
overall systemic fairness and ultimately threatens support for the existing system.
So, if we focus upon fairness in individual cases-procedural fairness-we also
must worry about systemic fairness. The goal I advocate is to improve the
functioning of the system in order to defuse the more far-reaching reforms that
could threaten the traditional and fundamental premises of the tort system. As
President Clinton said with respect to affirmative action, "Mend it, don't end it."
The goal of reform should be, again, to improve the accuracy, the fairness, and the
predictability of the system.
Predictability is important to promote settlement. Unless lawyers have a good
sense of what a case is worth, it becomes hard to settle a case. So, to the extent that
we can narrow the range of uncertainty, we narrow the variability; that will
encourage and promote settlements. Also, if insurers and lawyers do not know what
a case is worth, there are higher costs of administration (transactions costs). There
are more depositions, more cases may go to trial, and so forth. It is important to
build confidence in the system, so that liability becomes a more easily insurable
event.
B. Tort: A Link of Individual and Social Goals
Now, let me turn to the link of individual and social or systemic goals. The
values or the goals of the tort system are usually stated as compensation, deterrence,
and corrective justice or punishment. 4 The liability principle does achieve, in
theory at least, some balance. It has a social dimension; it balances costs and
benefits of precautions. The reasonable, prudent person concept is an attempt to
strike this balance.' 5

13. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 909-17.
14. See M.E. Occhialino, Examining the Spectrum of Noneconomic Harm:An Introduction, 35 N.M. L.
REV. 391 (2005).
15. In the field of medical malpractice, however, there is a special problem because of the professionally
based customary practice standard and the prevalence of third-party payment. See Siliciano, supra note 10, at
440-43.
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Causation has a social dimension, as well. Proximate cause is a socially
determined concept about the scope of responsibility. As a remedy, damages are
designed to have a restorative function, a deterrence function, and a corrective
function. But the award and magnitude of damages are related to the underlying
theory of liability in the first place. So you have to link the award of damages with
the theory of liability.
A problem arises, as in the case of noneconomic damages, when the theory of
liability is amorphous, 6 when it is akin to Justice Stewart's famous description of
obscenity: "I know it when I see it... ,,17 Many commentators believe, as I do, that
nonpecuniary loss is real,'" but when we observe the system in operation, we see
that the element of damages is highly variable.
In the work we did, we were only able to account by observable factors for sixty
percent of the variation-forty percent from severity alone, and a chunk from age.' 9
That is not to say that the other forty percent is necessarily inexplicable; that was
not our claim. In individual cases, a rational explanation may exist, but, overall,
there is a big variation in awards of nonpecuniary damages that is not readily
explained by observable factors. "It is not possible to fully and objectively adjust
for" all factors that "plausibly influence a jury's valuation, such as the subjective
nature of how an injury occurred. No amount of adjusting, however, is likely to
fully account for the extreme values."2 So, it is possible that the variability in
noneconomic damages awards is, to some significant extent, appropriate; some of
the variability is undoubtedly justified in ways that outside researchers just cannot
observe.2 ' But much of the variability is likely attributable to systematic
deficiencies in the process of assessing noneconomic damages.
The strategy that I propose is to better structure decision making on the remedial
side. In the absence of having a clearly delineated substantive standard, the strategic
goal is to embed this aspect of decision making in a more structured, less
discretionary process. Process can sometimes overcome problems of defining
liability theory.
1. The Importance of Context: Identifiable versus Statistical Lives
The context in which these cases come up is extremely important.22 The way
these cases arise makes attention to systemic values a real challenge. Doctrines of
remedy and of liability develop in litigation. So, in the world of risk management
16. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 909-17.
17. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. See e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary CostsofAccidents: Pain-and-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995). Other commentators reject the case for the legitimacy of
damages for noneconomic loss as an element of a damage award. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., PainandSuffering,
Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004).
19. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 923 n.81.
20. Id. at 923-24.
21. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damagesfor Nonpecuniary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 811 (1995) (stating that "there is no
objective way to measure the serverity" of pain-and-suffering injuries).
22. See Clark C. Havighurst et al., Strategiesin Underwritingthe Costs of CatastrophicDisease, 40 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 122, 138-45 (1976) (noting the importance of context and institutional design in the
assessment of risks and benefits).
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and evaluation, there is a literature that addresses the distinction between statistical
lives and identifiable lives.2 3 An example of framing an issue in terms of statistical
lives is asking the question of how many mine safety inspectors are needed by a
governmental agency, implicitly considering the tradeoffbetween money (for more
safety inspectors) and lives-if the agency has X more mine safety inspectors, then
Y more lives will be saved.
Society seems capable of having that type of conversation about statistical lives,
as it does as part of budgetary decision making. But when we see a little girl at the
bottom of a well-an identifiable life-it becomes rather ghoulish to be talking
about how many quality-adjusted life years are at stake and what are they worth in
discussing whether we're going to go down and try to save her. We tend to say,
"Spare no expense."
So when we have identifiable lives at stake, we tend to look at much more
symbolic kinds of issues about our humanity. Therefore, there is a lot more involved
in this context in the balancing of costs and benefits; so, it is harder to balance costs
and benefits in a systematic way when we deal with identifiable lives than when we
deal with statistical lives. Litigation inherently takes place in an identifiable lives
context rather than a statistical lives context.
2. The Importance of Context: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Decision Making
Under the common-law tradition, standards for liability and theories of damages
arise and become formulated in the context of lawsuits. These are all ex post
determinations. If a person is trying to conform to a standard of behavior, that
person only knows what the legal standard is ex post-after that person has been
through litigation.
Consider the case of a physician trying to determine whether to order an MRI
(magnetic resonance imaging scan) in a particular circumstance. The physician is
obliged to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care, but the
physician cannot really know what that standard is ex ante. The legal standard of
care is only knowable definitively ex post-after the physician has been sued and
experts testify to ajury what the standard of care is. That evidence is developed and
determined ex post.
What happens in an ex post setting is that risk is being considered, but the risk
at issue has already materialized since an injury has occurred. So it can be difficult,
ex post, to make an appropriate judgment about what the right rule or risk-benefit
trade-off ex ante should be. We might be willing to take certain risks ex ante, but
ex post we might have a very different perspective about that risk since it has been
realized and injury has occurred.24
And so, to assess risk appropriately, these decisions regarding risk-benefit tradeoffs should be structured in an ex ante context. When they are faced ex post, as in

23. Id. at 140-43.
24. Consider a person who receives a bad diagnosis from his or her doctor and then complains of the
unavailability of medical insurance to treat the illness. After the fact of diagnosis, when a patient knows that he
or she has an illness, that patient quite understandably may want to get coverage for medical care, but that certainly
is not insurance. Obviously, the ex ante and ex post perspectives regarding reasonable risks and requirements for
precaution are quite different.

Spring 2005]

DETERMINATION OF NONECONOMIC LOSS

a lawsuit, they are addressed in the context of an actual loss, not a potential or risk
of loss. It makes decisions much more difficult. The liability proposal addresses this
ex ante/ex post issue.
3. The Importance of Context: Micro versus Macro
Litigation occurs in a micro-context in which it is difficult to deal with systemic
(macro) issues. In the litigation context, there is nobody at the table whose
constituency is the broader macro system. Even insurers, who have a macro
systemic stake in the outcome, are obliged to act in the interest of their individual
clients in the micro context of defending them in a lawsuit. Other defendants are not
part of the process; they have no standing to assert broader systemic interests. So,
liability and damages rules that are established in the case of A versus B are
universally established." The micro context of litigation makes it difficult to deal
with the systemic issues in a structured way, unlike, say, an administrative hearing
or some other forum, where lots of sides are at the table and can make presentations
expressing broader systemic considerations. The strategic issue is how to
accommodate these various systemic factors within the context of remedy and
liability determination and within the framework of individual-case adjudication.
C. Dealing with Systemic Issues in the Context of Individual Cases: The
Problem of HorizontalEquity
Let us address systemic issues in the context of litigating individual cases.
Horizontal equity-treating similar cases alike-is an important systemic goal in
this context. When people see A being treated, for what seems to be similar
circumstances, in a very different way than the way B is treated or C is treated, that
raises concerns about the credibility and the legitimacy of the tort system. And
challenges to the credibility and legitimacy of the tort system threaten its support,
and erosion of support could undermine some of the fundamental premises and
values of the system.
Maintaining some restraint on overall costs-costs of paying liability claims,
insuring against liability claims, and adjudicating liability claims-is another
important systemic goal. We should strive to be fair to individual claimants in
customized adjudication settings; yet, systemically we must recognize a broader
interest in managing the level of overall costs.
The criminal law context provides an example of how government has sought to
deal with systemic issues of equity in the context of individualized adjudications of
guilt and sentencing. This concern about systemic equity and horizontal equity

25. 1remember being involved in litigation where it took a long time for people in the industry to understand
that an $18,000 case was going to establish a liability principle that could bring down many of the banks in
Memphis. It was hard for the banking industry to understand that its future depended on the outcome of a case that
did not even involve (at least directly) the banks themselves but a cotton broker. The case involved the
enforceability of forward contracts for cotton; since the banks had lent money using those contracts as collateral,
the unenforceability of the underlying contracts had critical significance to the banks, potentially making the loans
non-performing and threatening the financial viability of banks that were heavily invested in the cotton trade. The
Supreme Court eventually held the contracts to be enforceable. See Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20
(1974).
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resulted from the observed and largely unexplained variability of sentences across
jurisdictions within the federal judicial system.26 This disparity led to gaming the
system and considerable suspicion of the system. In the Vietnam War period, for
example, well-counseled draftees knew that if they wanted to resist induction into
the military, they should go to San Francisco; many judges in that district were well
known for their determination not to imprison draft resisters, instead giving them
a slap on the wrist. On the other hand, draft resisters prosecuted in other
jurisdictions were sent to prison and sometimes given lengthy sentences.
The result in the criminal area was adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines
that we have had for twenty years." The concern about the systemic value placed
on horizontal equity underlies the adoption of the sentencing guidelines. The
proposal for structuring decision making regarding noneconomic damage awards
draws on principles like those undergirding the federal sentencing guidelines.28
As originally implemented, the sentencing guidelines reduced flexibility and
discretion in individual cases. The criticism of those guidelines has been that they
undervalue considerations of customized justice, reducing the ability of judges to
fine-tune sentences to the particular facts and circumstances of individual
defendants. From a structural perspective, it is unlikely that there is a single correct
answer to the trade-off between addressing systemic objectives at the macro level
and accommodating the individuated claims of particular parties at the micro level.
Dealing with the issue requires a balancing; the issues are best seen as a
continuum-a more-or-less problem. As you tamp down on case-by-case discretion
and fine-tuning in the name of systemic equity, you also run the risk, in some cases,
of undervaluing individuated claims ofjustice in particular cases. That is a real cost
of any system that seeks to normalize variability across cases. So there is going to
be an inevitable and ongoing pull and push between these competing values of
systemic equity and customized fairness to individual claimants.
The result of this pull and push process is that systemic concerns have resulted
in state-law tort reform measures. This is not hypothetical; it is real. There are a
number of state-enacted damage caps on.nonpecuniary loss. Congress has under
consideration a national damage cap of $250,000 for nonpecuniary loss in the
medical malpractice area.29 Support for this type of legislation manifests the societal
concern for systemic values-horizontal equity and overall restraints on costs-and
the need to reach an appropriate accommodation of such systemic objectives and
values while pursuing objectives of individual justice within a case-specific system
of customized justice.
So, the proposal to be advanced is designed to improve the functioning of the
process for determining nonpecuniary damages. The goal is to address the legitimate, systemic concerns related to the present system of assessing nonpecuniary
26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (noting that disparities in sentencing by different
federal judges of similarly situated defendants led to enactment of federal sentencing guidelines).
27. The mandatory character ofthe federal sentencing guidelines was recently held unconstitutional on Sixth
Amendment grounds; they are now advisory for federal courts. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
28. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, which relied on the Sixth Amendment, does not undermine the viability of a
system of guidelines in the context of civil damages awards for noneconomic loss.
29. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare Act of 2005, S.354, 109th Cong.
(2005); H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005).
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damages, while doing a better job at accommodating the competing values of
customized justice than does a flat-cap approach. At the same time, we should use
this opportunity for reform as a vehicle for acting preemptively in the area of
liability reform, developing a strategy for ex ante standard setting that could help
contain some costs attributable to the practice of defensive medicine.
D. The Problem
Nonpecuniary damages are a significant factor in awards; some studies have
suggested that they account for about fifty percent of total damage awards in certain
types of tort cases.30 Damage awards for some noneconomic loss categories-such
as pain and suffering-have been recognized as a legitimate area of recompense
since 1763.31 Value-of-life research about hedonic values, examining the value
assigned to the loss of enjoyment of life, tends to support the legitimacy of
intangible factors such as noneconomic loss as elements of damages awards.32
Workers in risky industries secure an economic premium for the work they do,
suggesting that the loss of the enjoyment of life is a real loss and that people expect
to be compensated for the extra risks of such losses that they bear.
In the literature, some commentators have expressed a concern about the
incommensurability problem--"whether the effects of pain and suffering can be
monetized and spread."33 But in tort law we compensate for all kinds of losses by
substituting money for other values. And the value-of-life research shows that
people do choose to accept greater risk for a price, in essence trading off risk of loss
of enjoyment of life for money. Despite some of the interesting theoretical issues
raised, 34 by itself, incommensurability should not be a particularly troubling tort
policy concern in practical terms.
The issue may become more of a concern when linked to the commodification
question: whether we commodify body parts or commodify human life when we
compensate for pain and suffering.35 It is often difficult to understand "precisely
what is meant by commodification or why it is undesirable."3 6 The commodification
concept is typically introduced in the debate about the propriety of the use of
financial incentives for increasing the availability of organs for transplantation. It
is clear that some transactions-slavery, baby selling-are deemed by society to be
outside the ken of market transactions.

30. See Geistfeld, supra note 21, at 777 & n.10 ("[P]ain-and-suffering damages account for about half of
the total tort damages paid in products liability and medical malpractice cases."); Croley & Hanson, supra note 18,
at 1789 & nn. 14-15) ("[N]onpecuniary-loss damage awards...constitut[e] roughly fifty percent of total damage
awards....").
31. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note i, at 911 & n. 18 ("The first award for pain and suffering seems to date
from 1763.").
32. See, e.g., W. Kp Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE 93-113 (1983).
33. King, supra note 18, at 178.
34. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Compensationand Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993) (addressing
theoretical issues related to compensation and commensurability).
35. See generally Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987) (discussing
the commodification concept generally).
36. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 57, 74 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989).
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Whatever the proper bounds of the anti-commodification norm, however, it does
not seem compromised by compensating for pain and suffering or for nonpecuniary
loss. Ultimately, the concern about commodification of human body parts stems
from the introduction of market transactions for those body parts. The anticommodification concern starts with the perspective that something is being sold
ex ante. The question is whether a market transaction is appropriate. That is, when
someone has an entitlement (property), that person is not obliged to sell that interest
in property. The concern about commodification focuses on whether the matter at
hand-for example, human body parts-should, normatively, be considered
"property" and be subject to purchase and sale.
In the context of compensating for noneconomic loss such as pain and suffering,
there is no purchase or sale in an ex ante sense. A person is injured; as a result of
that injury, the person suffers loss. The question is whether the loss is compensable.
There is a compensable interest in the injured party, but the tort system's award of
damages protects that interest by establishing ex post liability. The victim's ability
to walk without assistance, even if characterized as a legally cognizable ownership
or property interest, is something that has already been taken away by the tortfeasor.
The victim is not selling it; the award of noneconomic damages is an ex post
remedy for something that has already been taken.
In short, there is no question about a barter or exchange ex ante. The victim's
interest, however characterized, has already been taken away by some wrongdoer,
and the victim is seeking compensation after the fact. So, alienability-and the
proper subjects of market-based transactions-which is what the anticommodification concern seems to be about, should not really be a problem in this
context.
While the award of damages for noneconomic loss does seem warranted, the
evidence shows that nonpecuniary damages are the most variable component of
damages awards, and that nonpecuniary awards are not readily explainable by
observable factors.37 There is also a societal concern that there is an excess dose of
Robin Hoodism-implicit wealth or income transfer on the part ofjuries. Jurors are
not repeat players with a good handle on other precedents. Juries come into the
process without information, without experience, without context, and without a
sense of historical continuity. A fear is that jurors have a limited horizon of
authority, knowledge, and experience. They see an injured victim and a wrongdoer,
and most everyone knows, although it cannot be discussed or admitted into
evidence, that there is insurance involved. The reasonable concern is that members
of the jury will take the opportunity, consistent with their limited scope of authority,
to transfer money from A to B, without taking into account the broader systemic
considerations.
That perception of juror behavior, linked to the evidence of unexplained
variability of awards for noneconomic loss, contributes to the support for tort
reform by undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the system. So, what should
be done?

37. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 919-24.

Spring 2005]

DETERMINATION OF NONECONOMIC LOSS

I think we should focus upon the existing lack of standards; the system revels in
the current imprecision. There is imprecision in substantive law related to
noneconomic loss, and that imprecision is reflected in the enormous discretion
juries have in calculating the award of noneconomic damages.
The substantive law allows forjury consideration of multiple factors. And juries
are basically a black box with little accountability. We have heard the story about
howjudicial review is disfavored through remittitur.3" There is a strong presumption
that what the juries find will be affirmed by trial judges in the remittitur process and
by appellate judges on appeal. So I think that part of the goal is to build in some
methods to enhance the opportunity for accountability.
Juries do not typically have a duty to explain their reasoning or the standards that
they apply. When the underlying substantive theory is so underdeveloped,
variability in awards raises real problems. An award is a remedy and should track
the underlying substantive theory of liability. Accountability is particularly difficult
to achieve in such circumstances, yet accountability is of particular importance in
that milieu. And accommodating systemic concerns of horizontal equity and overall
cost restraint becomes all the more difficult in such a loosey-goosey legal
environment.
The variability in awards for noneconomic loss raises costs of all kinds, including
costs of administration, impedes settlements, makes insurance less available or more
expensive, and undercuts the deterrent factor of tort law (which is enhanced with
more precision in outcome). So the goals of reform should be to develop improved
techniques for accountability, to provide a context for deliberation and decision
making through the furnishing of information, and to control or structure the
discretion of juries.
E. The Scenario Proposal
The proposal advanced here is designed to provide more structure, to narrow
discretion, to provide better opportunity for judicial review, and to provide a better
context and more information for juries. Severity of injury is by far the biggest
factor and explains about forty percent of variation in nonpecuniary loss. 39 Age is
the second factor.40 The approach being advanced is to establish a categorical, stepby-step decision-making approach. The goal is to constrain but not eliminate
discretion, to provide information, and, if liability is established, to have juries
determine a category at the time that liability is established.
A category could be an existing scale, like the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) scale,4 or it could be one that is developed specifically for
this purpose. The NAIC scale relies on severity of injury, and that makes sense
since severity of injury is the most significant factor in the award of noneconomic
damages. The NAIC uses a nine-factor scale. In earlier work, our group proposed
that one of those categories could be disaggregated, and we could have a ten-factor

38.
39.
40.
41.

See Occhialino, supra note 14, at 395.
See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 923.
Id. at 941.
For a description of the NAIC scale, see id. at 921.
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scale. But apart from this important detail, the overall goal here is to have a
threshold screen that has descriptions of each category. Juries would determine
which category the injury fell into, relying on the category descriptors.
So, let's assume that there is a ten-category set. For each category in the set, the
legislature or the judiciary (as in the process of formulating pattern jury instructions) would develop a certain number of scenarios. For the sake of symmetry,
assume that each category would have ten scenarios associated with it, a total of one
hundred scenarios overall. The scenarios would be formulated based upon
experience, data regarding past jury awards (to the extent available), judgment,
calculations and appraisals of hedonic values, etc. The goal is to have the scenarios
capture the array of considerations and concerns associated with the award of
noneconomic damages.
In the process of determining the other elements of loss, the jury would find, for
example, "This is a category-seven for nonpecuniary loss." Then in the same trialthis is a sequential process, not a bifurcated trial-the jury would receive for
deliberation the ten scenarios related to category seven. The jury would then be
asked to say which of those ten scenarios best fits the injury to this particular
plaintiff.
Once the jury selects the appropriate applicable scenario, it would receive
information about the range of damage awards built into each scenario. The range
of awards would show a floor and a ceiling amount. It would also show the twentyfifth percentile valuation, the fiftieth percentile valuation, and the seventy-fifth
percentile valuation.
The range of awards for each scenario would be established either legislatively
or by thejudiciary (as occurs in the process of developing pattern jury instructions).
These award ranges could be the result of a political judgment by the legislature or,
if prepared through the judiciary, through use of experience, judgment, past jury
awards (if available), and independent calculations of hedonic values.
Within the range of damage awards associated with each scenario, presumptive
validity would attach to a jury determination that fell between the twenty-fifth and
the seventy-fifth percentile of damage awards for the chosen scenario. The idea
would be, if the jury low-balls below the twenty-fifth percentile, it would have a
burden of explanation, and there would be a minimum award for the scenario. If the
jury went over the seventy-fifth percentile, it would also have a burden of
explanation. So there is balance, a symmetry, in this proposal. But, if the award is
within the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth percentile, then it would be accorded
presumptive validity. If the jury departs upward or downward, the jury would face
presumptive invalidity and it would have to explain its departure to the judge,
subject to appellate review. If the jury's explanation were sufficiently convincing,
then the departure would be upheld.
The idea is to create some flexibility, but to avoid or minimize gaming. That's
why the numbers associated with each scenario should only be revealed after the
jury makes the two previous categorical decisions: first, selecting the appropriate
category (primarily based on severity), and then, secondly, selecting the appropriate
scenario that best fits the particular facts and circumstances of the case. The system
would be built on the concept and the model of the original federal sentencing
guidelines, creating presumptive validity for the twenty-fifth to the seventy-fifth
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percentile. The goal is to provide more information, more structure, more
accountability, yet to retain the jury's role so that the jury is making these threshold
categorical decisions, and at the end of the day, is making a (more structured)
damage decision as well.
F. Liability: Ex Ante StandardSetting
Let me turn, finally, to the liability issue from a medical malpractice, defensive
medicine perspective. Defensive medicine adds cost to the overall medical care
marketplace. It is an appropriate factor to consider in the context of a discussion
about noneconomic damages, which are a concern in part because of considerations
of cost imposed on the overall tort system, and particularly on the medical care
arena. It is no accident that medical malpractice is where political pressures are
exerted to constrain the cost of the system.
"In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing (a)
the appropriate standard of care, (b) breach of that standard of care, and (c) a causal
42
'
relationship between the breach of the standard and the medical injury." The first
element, the standard of care, is typically based on the "customary practices of the
medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable behavior."4' 3 However, one
commentator contends, based on a comprehensive study of cases, that "[j]udicial
deference to physicians' customs is quietly eroding," with a significant number of
'
courts "phras[ing] the duty owed by physicians in terms of reasonability," and
'45
moving toward a "reasonable physician standard."
In practical terms, then, the standard of care is "typically based on professional
' at trial after an injury has
norms" established "by use of expert testimony"46
occurred. And the apparent erosion of deference means that the standard of care is
an increasingly imprecise standard. This raises concerns about the impact of ex post
standard setting on costs through the practice of defensive medicine.
Consider the situation of a doctor in an emergency room. A patient comes in with
head trauma. Does the physician order an MRI, or does he or she do watchful
waiting for a few hours? Assume that there is not a good protocol for that
decision.47 The doctor is facing an ex ante versus ex post problem. The doctor is
confronting a malpractice standard that is established ex post. The doctor only
really knows what the standard is when, after an injury has occurred, he or she has
been sued, and the plaintiff's expert physician witness has said, "This is the
standard of care, and it was breached here, causing injury."

42. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Cost ContainmentandMedical Malpractice,in HEALTHCARE DELIVERY
AND TORT: SYSTEMS ON A COLLISION COURSE? 75, 89 (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1992).
43. James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the ContinuedReliance on
Custom in DeterminingMedical Malpractice,79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1994).
44. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The QuietDemise ofDeference to Custom: MalpracticeLaw at the Millenium,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 170 (2000).
45. Id. at 187-88.
46. James F. Blumstein, The LegalLiabilityRegime: How WellsItDoingin Assuring Quality,Accounting
for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125,
130 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992) (failure to order an x-ray in
emergency room in context of Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act).
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The initial threshold requirement is the establishment through professional
standards of the standard of care. If this is only established after the fact, as in the
current system of medical negligence, the doctor in the emergency room faces a
question: "What do I do when I am trying to determine what the standard is?" The
safest thing to do is to order the MRI--especially if someone else (a third-party
payer) is going to pay for it. The balancing of costs and benefits is very risky at that
point. Having the standards of practice set after the fact rather than before the fact
arguably causes more utilization and expense than might be appropriate under the
circumstances. Expensive precautions that might not be warranted might
nevertheless be taken because of the uncertainty of an unknown standard of practice
that is to be set in an after-the-fact context when a particular risk has in fact resulted
in injury to an identifiable patient.
How can this problem be solved? One approach is to look at standard setting in
advance, so that a protocol in the emergency room allows a doctor to conform his
or her behavior to a defined standard, not to an amorphous and unknowable moving
target. That protocol would be developed by appropriately balancing costs and
benefits.
The problem is that these standards have always failed. The reason that these
standards have not caught on is that they can serve as just another tripwire for
liability for providers. They are a sword in the sense that their breach is evidence
that the standard of care has not been adhered to. But they are not, symmetrically,
a shield, since plaintiff can always adduce evidence that the protocol did not
properly evidence the standard of care under the circumstances.
A standard that is set in advance does not necessarily become the controlling
standard of care. Plaintiff can use the standard to persuade a jury that the protocol
has been disregarded and that the standard is evidence of what the standard of
practice is or should be. Seen this way, the advanced standard is just another
protocol that can serve as a landmine for doctors to step on and detonate to their
detriment. At the same time, the doctors do not get the symmetrical benefit, which
would be an assurance that compliance with the particular protocol satisfies the
requirement of conforming to the appropriate standard of care and is not subject to
after-the-fact relitigation.
So, in order to make the ex ante standard-setting approach work, there must be
a process by which the standard that is set ex ante becomes the controlling standard,
not to be revisited ex post in the course of litigation, rather than just evidence of the
standard. Federal law actually provides a potential solution for this. A provision of
federal law that has hardly been utilized during its thirty-three year lifetime may
well provide a vehicle for establishing professionally developed norms of practice
that would set the standard of care.48

48. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (2000):
No doctor of medicine or osteopathy and no provider (including directors, trustees, employers,
or officials thereof) of health care services shall be civilly liable to any person under any law of
the United States or any state (or political subdivision thereof) on account of any action taken
by him in compliance with or reliance upon professionally developed norms of care and
treatment applied by an organization under contract pursuant to section 1153 [42 USCS §
1320C-2] operating in the area where such doctor of medicine or osteopathy or provider took
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This provision provides for immunity for providers, doctors, and hospitals when
they act in compliance with or in reliance upon professionally developed norms of
care and treatment. The immunity is from state or federal liability. This suggests
that the key first element in a medical malpractice lawsuit-establishing the
standard of care-might be subject to ex ante development in a process the outcome
of which would result in a standard binding in subsequent litigation.
The federal law is drafted very broadly so that it would seem to cover all medical
malpractice cases, but there are no litigated cases to provide guidance or comfort.
But at least the federal provision would cover practice under Medicare, Medicaid,
and the federal employee health benefits program; that part would seem quite clear.
Whether the federal provision can be construed to cover medical malpractice cases
outside the federal funding sphere requires more investigation. But patients covered
by federal financing programs constitute a substantial number of people and a
substantial component of medical practice for many providers.
If federal law provides a vehicle and a process for establishing an ex ante
standard that is both a sword and a shield, so that symmetry exists, that compromise
might well become acceptable to the medical malpractice defense community. And
such a process would very likely provide some relief on the cost pressures that now
animate some of the political support for the much broader tort reforms under
consideration in Congress.
If we can target the areas of special concern for defensive medicine and alleviate
some of the costs of defensive medicine by adopting binding ex ante standards of
practice, the cost savings from reduced defensive medicine will likely dwarf the
fiscal consequences associated with awards of damages for nonpecuniary loss. Ifwe
can generate real savings in the practice of medicine by the adoption of clear and
definitive protocols of practice, then that might well alleviate some pressure
from-and be a safety valve for-some of the other cost-based criticisms of the
award of nonpecuniary damages.
II. SUMMARIZED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
DR. RUSTAD:4 9 James, you mentioned that you can already explain, with the
present system, the nonscheduled pain and suffering, or noneconomic damages, as
sixty percent of the variance.
BLUMSTEIN: By observable criteria.
RUSTAD: I was trained as a sociologist in a former life, and we were
overwhelmed when we had twenty-five percent variance. Which leads me to say
this system seems to be working fairly well-that if it's related to the severity of
injury, it's related to age, it's doing what we need it to do. I think that to have that
such action, but only if(1) he takes such action in the exercise of his profession as a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy or in the exercise of his functions as a provider of health care services; and (2)
he exercised due care in all professional conduct taken or directed by him and reasonably
related to, and resulting from, the actions taken in compliance with or reliance upon such
professionally accepted norms of care and treatment.
49. Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What Is Revealed About the Attitude of Compassionate
ConservativesTowards Nursing Home Practices,Tort Reform, andNoneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 337
(2005).
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amount of the system operating in that fashion empirically demonstrates that-why
schedule the damages? The burden of persuasion and proof is on the advocates of
reform. I do think that your scheduling is a superior mechanism; I would support it
over caps. But before I would support either proposal, I'd want to see that the
present system has so much variability.
BLUMSTEIN: I used the word "structuring" rather than "scheduling." I want to
move away from scheduling. It's not a schedule; it's a structuring process.
RUSTAD: What's the difference?
BLUMSTEIN: Well, one of the proposals that was in our original work looked
more like a schedule-where there were matrices. But here, what you have is a
range established where the jury-if it can defend itself, if this is a true outlier
case-has the freedom to show why the award should be above the seventy-fifth
percentile. There is flexibility. It's not a hard cap; it's not a hard schedule. It's a
flexible schedule. It's a flexible protocol, shall we say. But it does create the kinds
of central tendencies that we're talking about. So, it's not a schedule in the sense
of rigidity.
Now, maybe we're quibbling over words; it is what it is. I described it as a
structured process, where there are two categorical decisions and then a decision on
the noneconomic damage claim within some parameters. So the proposal is trying
to cabin discretion at each stage. As far as variability is concerned, the evidence we
developed established that the noneconomic damages component of awards was
much more variable and unexplained based on observable factors than other
components. The award of noneconomic damages is much more variable and much
more visible.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: More variability than punitive damages?
BLUMSTEIN: Well, we didn't study punitives, because in medical malpractice
cases in our data set, they were very-or relatively-rare.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What was the data you looked at, on the sixty percent?
What type of cases? I heard you mention workers' cases, and I was wondering if it
involved employment or injured workers' cases.
BLUMSTEIN: No, no, not workers' comp.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So it seems to me like your categorical approach is not
much different than a workers' comp approach.
BLUMSTEIN: There is a certain analogy to workers' compensation, because
workers' comp does try to structure damages claims to some degree. But, where the
injury is to a scheduled member, workers' comp tends to be a much harder schedule
than what we have proposed. And the data did not come from workers' comp cases.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You mentioned when you talked about the range of
damage awards that would be available, two things; that the jury wouldn't know in
advance before it picked the number, in terms of the category that would apply,
what damage range would be tied to that particular category. So the jury is sort of
flying blind in terms of ultimate outcome. First, they have to pick the category, then
they getBLUMSTEIN: And that's the goal.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, maybe that's a good goal, and maybe it's not. It
seems to me in order to put this kind of system into effect, you're talking about
legislation, correct?
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BLUMSTEIN: Well, some form of legislation. Some of it could well be done
through judicial management, at least in some jurisdictions. But I think legislation
is a superior process.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, that would be an interesting usurpation of a jury
trial right, and goes all the way to the problem of comparability review in the
federal courts. At the appellate level, remittitur is becoming an even more frequent
phenomenon. And I want to talk about that, just for a second, but it seems to me that
to the extent that you're going to have some legislation that would effectuate this,
it's going to be subject to the meat grinder of the political process. Now, you used
the term, quote, "political overlay" in the range of damage awards. The reason why
that concerns me, and it takes me back to workers' compensation, is that it seems
to me the tendency will be, in any legislative arena in which the forces for tort
reform already have significant power, that the damage ranges are likely going to
be set at under compensatory levels, as they are in workers' compensation.
BLUMSTEIN: Well, workers' comp reflects a different deal.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I understand what the deal is supposed to be in workers'
comp, and yet I think people can still make the argument that it results in some
pretty severe injustices. But going back to the point that there's already a high
degree of explainability for the difference in jury awards on nonpecuniary harms,
and if this approach would run the risk of a political solution that would be under
compensatory, then I start to worry about whether it's worth going down that road.
BLUMSTEIN: Well, again, the goal that we had when we did this work was to
develop a reporting system on damages, and to try to use an empirical basis of past
awards to help put the numbers into the system that we're talking about, with some
normative overlay. Because there has to be some judgment that this may-since it's
a systemic concern, it's a political process-include a political dimension. It's hard
to know what the right outcome on workers' comp is. Whether it's a right answer
or wrong answer, it goes to the legitimacy of the political process, in which there
are lots of different players. I think it's important that there be a check, because
there's legitimate criticism. Geistfeld and others raised the question whether a
system should rely on empirical evidence. Geistfeld's piece is really interesting.5"
He said, "Oh, I hate the idea of empirical, because these juries may have gotten it
wrong in the first place." And at the end of the day, he comes back and says, "Oh,
there's no better way. You need to do empirical, even if we recognize that that's a
problem." Well, all of these are compromises. And I think-I'd like to see a
commission that builds upon past practice on the hedonic value literature, but
ultimately that makes some normative judgments. I think that any kind of balance
or trade-off in that systemic versus individual arena is going to have a political
dimension. I think that the concern about being fearful of a political process
basically is skepticism of democracy. It may not be to your political taste, but that's
the system we have to resolve these issues.

50. See Geistfeld, supra note 21, at 840 ("As juries appear to be a better 'survey mechanism' than the
alternatives, prior jury determinations.. would provide the best method for deriving the scheduled awards should
it become necessary to resort to a damages schedule.").

